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PUTTING STORED-VALUE CARDS IN THEIR PLACE 
by 
Liran Haim* & Ronald Mann** 
This Essay explores the effects of stored-value cards on social welfare. We 
argue that stored-value cards, in general, are socially beneficial payment 
devices. Their burgeoning use benefits society in three main plains. First, 
by replacing paper-based instruments in market segments previously in-
accessible to card-based payments, stored-value cards lower the private 
and public costs of payment transactions. Second, by extending the use of 
card-based payment systems towards lower- and middle-income house-
holds, stored-value cards foster inclusion of those households in the fi-
nancial mainstream of our society. Third, by operating without an ex-
tension of credit, stored-value cards help to limit the uniquely American 
reutilization of credit transactions associated with the widespread use of 
credit-card borrowing. 
We further identify several risks associated with the use of stored-value 
cards. First, as in many cases their issuers are not federal banks, stored-
value cards expose consumers to the possibility of losing funds in the case 
of issuer's insolvency. Second, as their mechanism is vulnerable to data 
breaches, they expose consumers to unauthorized uses of their funds—as 
opposed to other payment cards where consumers enjoy regulatory protec-
tion on this matter. Third, they raise the issue of the unused funds re-
maining on the card after most of it has been depleted. 
We recommend policies that will foster the use of stored-value cards, while 
adopting several rules that will confine their associated risks. We there-
fore call for adequate supervision that will assure the availability of de-
posits insurance to most stored-value cards; an extension of the current 
unauthorized use rules to stored-value cards; and a mechanism that will 
allow cash out of small unused funds associated with those cards. We al-
so emphasize the need to exempt from regulation small stored-value cards 
programs in order to foster their beneficial use in contexts where the risks 
of harm are slight. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Stored-value cards are the latest innovation in the payment-card 
field. After the 1970s introduced consumers to credit cards and the 1990s 
to debit cards, stored-value cards are the latest product trying to lead 
consumers forward to a cashless society. The spread of stored-value cards 
is not limited to a specific country. Rather, in recent years consumers 
around the globe have started to include stored-value cards among the 
payment devices they hold in their wallets. In the United States, the cards 
were used for at least $150 billion of transactions in 2012 and were pro-
jected to surpass $200 billion in 2013.1 Canada reported more than $70 
billion in stored-value card transactions in 2010.2 Stored-value cards are 
also commonly used in Japan,3 Europe,4 and Russia.5 Even in the highly 
 
1 Purchase Volume at Merchants on U.S. General Purpose Cards, Nilson Rep., May 
2013, at 1, 1; BITS, Prepaid Access Cards: Overview and Emerging Risks 4 (July 2012), 
available at http://www.bits.org/publications/fraud/PrepaidCardsRisksFinalJul2012.pdf. 
2 Task Force for the Payments Sys. Review, Scenarios for the Future of the 
Canadian Payment System 61, 63 (2011), available at http://www.viewpointlearning.com/ 
wpcontent/uploads/2011/05/FINANCE_Viewpoint_Report_English.pdf (stating that 
the total transactions value in Canada in 2010 was $7.2 trillion and that the portion of 
stored-value cards out of this value was 1%). 
3 Bank of Japan, Recent Developments in Electronic Money in Japan 4 (Dec. 
2012), available at http://www.boj.or.jp/en/research/brp/ron_2012/data/ron121221a.pdf 
(stating that in June 2012 the value of transactions made with stored-value cards was 
JPY 198.1 billion). 
4 Bank for Int’l Settlements, Statistics on Payment, Clearing and 
Settlement Systems in the CPSS Countries: Figures for 2011, at 445 (Jan. 2013), 
available at http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d107.pdf (stating that Italy reported 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/
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concentrated payment market of Israel, banks and merchants now offer 
several types of stored-value cards.6 
Despite their apparent attractiveness to merchants and consumers, 
the cards have drawn withering and pervasive criticism from regulators 
and consumer advocates. Most obviously, stored-value cards are high on 
the list of products under scrutiny from the Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Bureau (CFPB). Among other things, the CFPB issued a 2012 notice 
of a general rulemaking regarding stored-value cards, generally express-
ing concern about the “lack of a comprehensive federal regulatory re-
gime.”7 The following year, the CFPB issued an alert emphasizing con-
cerns about employer compliance with regulations related to payroll 
cards.8 And it is not as if the CFPB is pursuing an agenda of its own in 
opposition to the will of Congress. To the contrary, leading legislators 
commonly press the CFPB to move even more vigorously.9 And, of 
course, stored-value cards are a common topic of proposed federal legis-
lation.10 Nor is attention limited to the federal level. Rather, each of the 
50 states has some form of statutory regulation of stored-value cards of 
one sort or another.11 
Although the great majority of the recent regulatory attention has 
focused on the problem of fees, the pervasive criticism of unduly high 
fees is fostering an atmosphere of general hostility to the basic product. 
 
$13.507 billion of stored-value-cards transactions in 2011, the Netherlands reported 
$0.629 billion, and Germany reported $0.174 billion). 
5 Id. (stating that Russia had $6.757 billion of stored-value-cards transactions in 
2011). 
6 Although credit cards continue to dominate the Israeli market, several of the 
central issuers now offer stored-value cards. For instance, Leumi Card is now offering 
a onetime closed-loop gift card in the amount of approximately $250. Leumi also 
offers a new general-purpose reloadable open-loop card called “Leumi Card Cash,” 
available mainly for teenagers. See Press Release, Leumi, Leumi Card CASH: Loaded 
Debit Card for Teens (May 23, 2012), available at http://www.leumi.co.il/Articles/26906. 
Israel Post and C.A.L. (another large Israeli issuer) also offer an open-loop Visa 
stored-value card. See Visa CAL Debit Card, Israel Post, http://www.israelpost.co.il/ 
postshirut.nsf/misparide/140?opendocument&L=EN; Loaded Visa Card, CAL, 
https://www.cal-online.co.il/he-IL/Cal/Cards/special/prepaid/Pages/welcome.aspx. 
7 Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 77 Fed. Reg. 30,923, 30,924 
(proposed May 24, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1005). 
8 Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau, CFPB Bulletin 2013-10, at 1–4 (Sept. 12, 
2013). 
9 E.g., Letter to Richard Cordray, Director, CFPB & Seth Harris, Acting Sec’y, 
U.S. Dep’t Labor (July 11, 2013), reprinted in Press Release, U.S. Senator Richard 
Blumenthal, Blumenthal Urges CFPB, DOL to Protect Workers Paid with Predatory 
Payroll Cards (July 11, 2013), available at http://www.blumenthal.senate.gov/ 
newsroom/press/release/blumenthal-urges-cfpb-dol-to-protect-workers-paid-with-
predatory-payroll-cards (letter from 16 senators to CFPB urging more investigation 
and regulation of stored-value cards). 
10 E.g., Prepaid Card Disclosure Act of 2014, S. 1903, 113th Cong. (2014). 
11 Heather Morton, Gift Cards and Gift Certificates Statutes and Legislation, Nat’l 
Conf. State Legislators (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-
services-and-commerce/gift-cards-and-certificates-statutes-and-legis.aspx. 
LCB_18_4_Art_4_Mann_Haim_Final (Do Not Delete) 3/30/2015  8:21 PM 
992 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:4 
With the CFPB poised for a general rulemaking about the product as a 
whole, it is important to situate the problems with fees in a broader con-
text that considers not only the problematic attributes of some of the 
cards, but also the potential benefits of the product more generally. 
In that vein, the purpose of this Essay is to urge a redirection of the 
regulatory and policy concerns related to stored-value cards. Without 
downplaying issues related to fees, protection for unauthorized pay-
ments, and the like, we contend that the narrow focus on what might be 
called the “traditional” regulatory issues pertaining to payment cards has 
obscured broad social benefits likely to accrue from broader use of the 
product. Among other things, the cards are likely to speed the transition 
to paperless transactions, foster democratization of the card market (be-
cause they are more useful for low- and moderate-income (LMI) house-
holds than credit cards and debit cards), and nudge consumers away 
from the routinized borrowing associated with the use of credit cards. 
Collectively, we urge, those benefits are so important that they out-
weigh the minor regulatory issues that have preoccupied regulators and 
consumer advocates to date. We propose a set of simple and straightfor-
ward regulatory reforms designed to address the significant issues appar-
ent from existing usage, without burdening the product so heavily as to 
stifle its deployment. 
The first Part of the Essay describes the use of stored-value cards, 
their penetration of United States and global markets, and the legal 
frameworks that govern them. The second Part analyzes the principal fac-
tors that weigh for, and against, the use of stored-value cards. It empha-
sizes the substantial benefits of stored-value cards over other payment in-
struments, and concludes that the benefits justify policies that foster their 
spread. The third Part addresses the risks associated with stored-value 
cards. It considers not only the problem of fees, which has pervaded the 
existing discourse, but broader issues related to the product’s basic struc-
ture. We close briefly with a call for a broad-minded regulatory approach 
that takes care, lest well-meaning regulation deprive low- and moderate-
income households of a product that can provide so much to them. 
I. WHAT IS A “STORED-VALUE” CARD? 
We start by describing the product in question. The “stored-value” 
card, often called a “prepaid” card, is a payment device that to the ordi-
nary consumer looks exactly like a conventional credit card or debit card. 
What distinguishes the stored-value card from those older and more 
common products is that the stored-value card allows access to a balance 
previously associated with the card (“placed” or “deposited” on the card 
in the typical usage). Because the card has the same form as conventional 
credit and debit cards, and because the most commonly used ones bear 
Visa and MasterCard brands on their face, they can be used just as the 
more conventional cards: to withdraw funds from an ATM or to buy 
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products or services from merchants that accept Visa and MasterCard 
products. 
Although it remains relatively unexamined in the academic litera-
ture, the stored-value card has been the most prominent innovation in 
the payment industry since the full-scale introduction of the debit card 
about fifteen years ago.12 From essentially no market share in 2000, the 
cards have spread rapidly. In 2012, they were used for more than $150 
billion of retail purchase transactions, or 4% of all payment-card transac-
tions.13 This may seem small compared to the totals for credit and debit 
cards ($2.2 trillion and $1.8 trillion, respectively), but it is still impressive 
for such a young device.14 
Mechanically, the use of the card is no different from use of a con-
ventional credit or debit card. The consumer decides to initiate a retail 
transaction with a merchant. If the consumer decides to use the stored-
value card to pay for this transaction, the first step is verifying that the 
merchant accepts the particular stored-value card in the consumer’s pos-
session. If the card is a general-purpose one (with a Visa or MasterCard 
brand) then all merchants that accept credit cards will accept it.15 If the 
card bears a more limited-purpose brand, then the consumer would have 
to figure this out on a case-by-case basis; often the card will be good only 
at the merchant (or group of merchants) indicated on the card. If the 
merchant accepts the card (which essentially means that the merchant 
has an agreement with a financial institution that can retrieve funds from 
the card to pay for the transaction), then the consumer will, usually, 
swipe the card in the merchant’s terminal. Alternatively, the consumer 
might choose to enter a PIN. Acting through the merchant’s acquirer, 
the point-of-sale terminal would initiate a connection to a remote server 
that contains data regarding the stored-value card’s balance. After con-
firming that a sufficient balance for the transaction exists, it would then 
reduce the stored-value card balance by that amount and credit the mer-
chant with that amount (reduced by the applicable interchange and ac-
quisition fees).16 Similarly, as with branded credit and debit cards, the 
 
12 Ronald J. Mann, Information Technology and Non-Legal Sanctions in Financing 
Transactions, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1627, 1634 (2001). 
13 Purchase Volume at Merchants on U.S. General Purpose Cards, supra note 1, at 1, 9. 
This data surely understates actual usage because it accounts only for general-purpose 
stored-value cards (those with a Visa or MasterCard brand). 
14 Id. The rapid uptake is particularly impressive given the traditional hurdles 
new payments products face in establishing critical masses of users and merchants at 
the same time. See generally David S. Evans, Platform Economics: Essays on Multi-
Sided Businesses 282–374 (2011). 
15 The Visa and MasterCard honor-all-cards rules compel this result. See Ronald J. 
Mann, Essay, Making Sense of Payments Policy in the Information Age, 93 Geo. L.J. 633, 655 
(2005). 
16 Benjamin Geva, The Law of Electronic Funds Transfer § 6.02 (2014); 
Ronald J. Mann, Payment Systems and Other Financial Transactions 336–41 
(5th ed. 2011). 
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consumer with such a card ordinarily can use it to withdraw funds from 
most ATMs; because the entities that operate those ATMs typically are 
members of the Visa and MasterCard network, they can route stored-
value transactions through those networks just as they would route credit 
or debit transactions.17 
As the discussion above suggests, all stored-value cards are not the 
same. Generally speaking, for functional purposes the cards fall into two 
main categories: open-loop and closed-loop cards. Open-loop cards typi-
cally carry a brand (like Visa or MasterCard) that is accepted at a wide va-
riety of merchants. Those stored-value cards can be used at any merchant 
that previously has engaged the services of a processor who is a member 
of the stored-value card brand-payment network.18 Closed-loop cards, by 
contrast, normally can be used only at the specific merchant that issued 
them. In essence, then, the purchase of such a card is perceived as a pre-
payment for a later purchase at the merchant—hence the common term 
“prepaid” cards.19 By far the most important application for those cards is 
the gift card, redeemable only at the merchant (or group of merchants) 
that issued it. 
It is also important to note whether the card is a “single-charge” card 
or a “reloadable” card. Most commonly, open-loop cards can be reloaded 
and spent in a continuous (endless) cycle; by contrast, closed-loop cards 
typically are good only for one use, the expenditure of the funds original-
ly placed on the card.20 
Although the discussion above emphasizes the functional similarities 
of stored-value cards and conventional credit and debit cards, they are 
fundamentally different in the relation between the issuer and the card-
holder. The credit card rests on the issuer’s individualized underwriting 
decision to extend a credit line to the cardholder; when the card is used, 
the transactions are posted to a revolving credit account which can be 
repaid in small payments in the ordinary course over the ensuing years.21 
The debit card accesses a conventional demand-deposit account and thus 
is (with rare exceptions) issued by the bank where the consumer main-
tains such an account; for most consumers there is only one such bank. 
Transactions on that card are funded by immediate withdrawals from the 
 
17 Mann, supra note 15, at 654–55. 
18 Philip Keitel, The Laws, Regulations, Guidelines, and Industry Practices That Protect 
Consumers Who Use Gift Cards 16 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Discussion Paper, 2008), 
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/consumer-credit-and-payments/payment-cards-
center/publications/discussion-papers/2008/D2008JulyGiftCard.pdf. 
19 For a more elaborated review of closed-loop stored-value cards and their 
regulation, see Philip Keitel, Federal Regulation of the Prepaid Card Industry: 
Costs, Benefits, and Changing Industry Dynamics 12–16 (2010), available at 
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/consumer-credit-and-payments/payment-cards-
center/events/conferences/2011/C2011-Federal-Regulation-of-Prepaid-Card-
Industry.pdf. 
20 Id. at 13–14. 
21 See Mann, supra note 16, at 151–58. 
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account; if a transaction exceeds the balance of funds already in the ac-
count, the bank can honor it under the ordinary procedures for authoriz-
ing overdrafts on the account.22 
The stored-value card, by contrast, requires no such relationship be-
tween the issuer and the cardholder. Transactions on those cards are 
paid out of balances previously provided to the issuer. If a purchase ex-
ceeds the balance on the card, the issuer will honor the transaction only 
by mistake. The issuance of the card is simple, because it requires only 
the transmission of funds to the issuer. 
Finally, it warrants noting that the legal frameworks for the cards are 
entirely different. Because they involve the extension of credit, credit 
cards are regulated in many important ways by the Truth in Lending Act 
and Regulation Z.23 Because they access an asset account electronically, 
debit cards are governed by the Electronic Fund Transfers Act and Regu-
lation E.24 Because stored-value cards conventionally have been regarded 
as doing neither of those things, they are, with limited exceptions, gov-
erned by neither of those bodies of law, and thus remain relatively un-
regulated. 
II. THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ROLE OF STORED-VALUE CARDS 
Any sensible opinion about the appropriate policymaking response 
to the rise of stored-value cards must start from an informed sense of the 
role stored-value cards play in our society and economy. In our view, that 
role has the potential to be strongly positive: the benefits of stored-value 
cards, as compared to the payment instruments that they replace, are so 
substantial that they justify policies that foster and support the spread of 
the product. We make three main points. First, by replacing paper-based 
instruments in market segments previously inaccessible to card-based 
payments, they lower the private and public costs of payment transac-
tions. Second, by extending the use of card-based payment systems by 
low- and moderate-income households, they foster inclusion of those 
households in the financial mainstream of our society. Third, because 
they operate without an extension of credit, they help to limit the 
uniquely American routinization of credit transactions associated with 
the widespread use of credit-card borrowing. 
A. Replacing Paper-Based Payment Systems 
The most startling thing about the systems used for payments in this 
country is that, even as we pass through the second decade of the twenty-
 
22 See id. at 200–05. 
23 Truth in Lending Act of 1968, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f (2012); Truth in 
Lending (Regulation Z), 12 C.F.R. § 1026 (2013). 
24 Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693–1693r (2012); 12 C.F.R. 
§1005 (2014). 
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first century, so many consumers continue to use paper-based systems for 
payment. To get a sense for the continuing usage of paper-based pay-
ment systems, it is instructive to review current data from the Boston 
Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Payment Choice. With respect to 
cash, it is no surprise that substantially all consumers (99.8% as of 2009) 
are users;25 what is more surprising is the share of retail payment transac-
tions in which cash is used (still 25.2% as of 2009).26 Although many 
readers of this Essay may not be among them, the same survey shows that 
85.4% of consumers were still using checks in 2009; although check use 
has fallen substantially, checks were still used for 5.8% of retail transac-
tions in 2009.27 
This is not just an amusing factoid about the Luddite behaviors of 
the typical American consumer. On the contrary, the costs of continued 
use of currency and checks—as compared to electronic payments—are 
an embarrassment to an economy struggling to modernize and compete 
efficiently on the global stage. 
1. Setting a Baseline: The Costs of Electronic Payments 
The starting point of our analysis is that the costs of processing are a 
deadweight social loss, the paradigmatic “cost of doing business.” All oth-
er things being equal, the optimal payment system is the payment system 
that moves money from payor to payee at the lowest cost. From that per-
spective, electronic payments plainly dominate paper-based payments. 
For one thing, although it is difficult to get a firm understanding of the 
precise level of costs, it is plain that the cost of processing a card-based 
electronic payment is already far less than the cost of any of the major 
paper-based systems. The best current estimates suggest that the “all-in” 
processing costs are substantially less than a dime per payment.28 Im-
portantly, aside from those processing costs, the merchants that receive 
the payments have only insubstantial expenses: they need not pay em-
ployees to handle, protect, or deposit the “electronic” funds as they do 
the paper-based systems discussed below. Reflecting that intuition, the 
best evidence of comparative costs suggests that credit-free payment cards 
like stored-value cards are the cheapest of all payment systems.29 
 
25 Kevin Foster et al., The 2009 Survey of Consumer Payment Choice 60, 103  
(Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Public Policy Discussion Papers, 2011), 
http://www.bostonfed.org/economic/ppdp/2011/ppdp1101.pdf (also stating that 
the incidence of the use of paper-based payment instruments in 2009 was 96.2%). 
26 Id. at 68 (the data include uses for retail, service, and person-to-person 
payments). 
27 Id. at 68, 103. The study also states that 25.1% of consumers reported using 
money orders. The incidence of using cash in 2009 was 92.2%, and the incidence of 
using checks was 76.1%. In comparison, the incidence of using debit cards was only 
67.6%, and the incidence of using credit cards was 60.8%. Id. at 60. 
28 Keitel, supra note 19, at 21 (suggesting that as of 2010, an electronic funds 
transfer (EFT) costs less than a dime). 
29 See Daniel D. Garcia Swartz, Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Move 
Toward a Cashless Society: A Closer Look at Payment Instrument Economics, 5 Rev. Network 
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But whatever the costs presently might be, we can be sure that they 
will fall substantially in the years to come, both because of the steadily 
continuing decline in the costs of processing electronic information and 
because of the increasing scale and presumable cost-effectiveness of the 
electronic systems dedicated to this particular enterprise.30 We can see 
this easily if we look overseas, where this area of technology has devel-
oped much faster than in the United States. Most obviously, the last few 
years have seen a steady rise in the usage of so-called “virtual stored-value 
cards,” especially in Japan, where the product is commonly integrated di-
rectly into mobile-phone hardware.31 Those products allow consumers to 
purchase and recharge a virtual card issued to them over the internet. 
That “card” is a purely electronic artifact, accessed through a code pro-
vided upon deposit of the funds to the associated account.32 
The baseline, then, is a rapid and inexpensive system, with no obvi-
ous external effects on those that do not use the system, the costs of 
which predictably will fall as the years go by. The story for paper-based 
systems is quite different. 
2. The Costs of Cash 
It is easy to understand the widespread continuing use of cash as a 
consumer payment system. Because it requires no evaluation of credit—
either by the merchant or by any third-party network—cash comes closer 
to universal acceptance than any other payment system. Also, cash deliv-
ers a conclusively final payment at the moment of the transaction, a high-
ly attractive feature (at least for those who receive it). But lest a romanti-
cized view of cash carry us away, we should remember why we collectively 
are using cash much less frequently than we used to, and why almost all 
merchants have come to accept non-cash payments. 
 
Econ. 175, 195 (2006) (ranking the overall cost of different payment card 
transactions from high to low as, cash, then credit card, then check , then debit card). 
As we mentioned before, payment cards’ costs have probably decreased rapidly in the 
last seven years due to economies of scale. The important point, however, is that 
without the additional costs associated with credit, payment cards are the cheapest of 
the readily available payment systems. 
30 On the importance of economies of scale to the development of payment card 
systems, see Ronald J. Mann, Credit Cards and Debit Cards in the United States and Japan, 
55 Vand. L. Rev. 1055, 1071 (2002). 
31 Jean J. Luyat, Comment, A Tale of Regulation in the European Union and Japan: 
Does Characterizing the Business of Stored-Value Cards as a Financial Activity Impact Its 
Development?, 18 Pac. Rim L. & Pol’y J. 525, 530–34 (2009). For a general discussion 
of the reasons Japanese payment technology has developed differently from that in 
the United States, see Mann, supra note 30, at 1059–60; Stephanie M. Wilshusen et al., 
Consumers’ Use of Prepaid Cards: A Transaction-Based Analysis 63 (Fed. Reserve Bank of 
Phila., Discussion Paper, 2012), http://www.phil.frb.org/consumer-credit-and-
payments/payment-cards-center/publications/discussion-papers/2012/D-2012-
August-Prepaid.pdf (estimating at 10% the portion of web general-purpose 
reloadable cards out of the entire general-purpose reloadable-card market in the 
United States). 
32 Luyat, supra note 31, at 530–34. 
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The first point is the surprisingly substantial cost of creating and re-
placing currency, a task that falls here (as in most countries) to the cen-
tral bank. In this country, as of 2012, the Federal Reserve was spending 
between 5 and 10 cents on each bill33 and between 2 and 11 cents on 
each coin that it produces.34 Because neither notes nor coins last forev-
er,35 the government incurs those costs ceaselessly, and their volume 
steadily increases: as the size of the economy grows more rapidly than the 
use of cash decreases, the total amount of cash in circulation continues 
to increase from year to year.36 Moreover, this discussion says nothing of 
the plainly substantial costs that the Federal Reserve incurs collecting and 
disposing of worn-out currency and coins.37 
The second point is the costs to the merchants that accept cash. 
Merchants that accept cash necessarily spend time counting and pro-
cessing the currency, costs that apparently approximate 12 cents per re-
tail transaction.38 Moreover, because it is so much easier to “redeploy” 
stolen cash than any other payment instrument, merchants (like con-
sumers) obviously experience a major risk whenever they are in posses-
sion of substantial amounts of cash. It should be no surprise that those 
who cannot avoid that risk incur substantial expenses to protect them-
 
33  Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 2012 New Currency Budget  
(Dec. 2011), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/foia/files/2012newcurrency.pdf. 
34 U.S. Mint, Dep’t of the Treasury, 2012 Biennial Report to the Congress 
on the Current Status of Coin Production Costs and Analysis of Alternative 
Content 4 (Dec. 2012), available at http://www.usmint.gov/about_the_mint/ 
pdfs/united_states_mint_report_2012_biennial_report_to_the_congress_on_the_cur
rent_status_of_coin_production_costs_and_analysis_of_alternative_content_decembe
r_2012.pdf (excluding dollar coins and not including distribution cost to the public). 
35 FAQs, U.S. Mint (2014), http://www.usmint.gov/faqs/circulating_coins/# 
anchor1000 (stating that the lifespan of a coin is 25 years); How Long Is the Lifespan of 
U.S. Paper Money?, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (July 10, 2014), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/how-long-is-the-life-span-of-us-paper-money.htm 
(stating that the lifespan of a note varied between 3.7 years to 15 years, depending on 
the type and value of the note). 
36 Bruce Bartlett, America’s Most Profitable Export Is Cash, N.Y. Times Economix 
Blog (Apr. 9, 2013), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/09/americas-
most-profitable-export-is-cash. The costs of producing bills have particularly 
frustrated the Federal Reserve, which has tried repeatedly to shift consumers to 
larger-valued coins that would parallel the Euro or to larger bills (like the ill-fated 
two-dollar bill). See Matthew Healey, A Push for Dollar Coins, Using Presidential Fervor, 
N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 2007, at C3; Collen Curry, Coins Could Replace Dollar Bills, Save US 
$5.6 Billion, ABC News (Oct. 25, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/ 
business/2011/10/coins-could-replace-dollar-bills-save-us-5-6-billion. 
37 See James Bohn, Diana Hancock & Paul Bauer, Estimates of Scale and Cost 
Efficiency for Federal Reserve Currency Operations, Econ. Rev. 2001 Q.4, at 2, 24 n.41 
(estimating the costs of destroying unfit currency at $4.6 million a year). Because 
currency demand increases each year, those costs also continue to increase. 
38 David B. Humphrey, Replacement of Cash by Cards in U.S. Consumer Payments, 56 
J. Econ. & Bus. 211, 212 (2004) (stating that the “all-in” handling cost of such a bill 
for a merchant is 12 cents). 
LCB_18_4_Art_4_Mann_Haim_Final (Do Not Delete) 3/30/2015  8:21 PM 
2014] PUTTING STORED-VALUE CARDS IN THEIR PLACE 999 
selves.39 It is also not surprising, then, that scholars analyzing the com-
parative cost of different payment instruments readily conclude that cash 
is the most expensive of all, with an all-in marginal cost per transaction of 
approximately one dollar.40 
The third point is the broader social cost of routinized cash use. All 
informed observers agree that cash is uniquely suited for the facilitation 
of widespread criminal enterprise; most importantly, cash is by far the 
easiest vehicle for laundering the profits of crime and thus insulating 
them from retributive public scrutiny.41 The link to criminal activity is not 
chimerical; statistical analysis readily demonstrates that the risk of crime 
is greater for societies that depend on cash payments than for those that 
depend on card-based payments.42 A shift to the routinized use of more-
traceable payment instruments makes the large-scale use of cash ever 
more conspicuous. Thus, to the extent stored-value cards shift routine 
transactions away from cash, they undermine the ease of illicit use of 
cash.43 
3. The Social Costs of Checks 
The cost-based advantage of stored-value cards over checks is even 
more pronounced. Consider first the use of checks and cards in retail 
transactions. If a stored-value card transaction is only slightly less cum-
bersome than a cash transaction (the swipe is faster than counting out 
coins and change), check transactions afflict the merchant with delay of 
an entirely different order. Existing studies suggest a time savings of 
more than thirty seconds per transaction (comparing cards to checks), 
and given recent advances in the speed of card processing, the current 
figure doubtlessly exceeds a minute per transaction.44 This improves the 
 
39 Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 2012 New Currency Budget 8 
(Dec. 2011), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/foia/files/2012newcurrency.pdf 
(stating that the budget for currency transportation in 2012 was $22.8 million). 
40 See Garcia Swartz, supra note 29, at 193; supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
41 Ronald J. Mann, Charging Ahead: The Growth and Regulation of 
Payment Card Markets 10 (2006); Keith McCarthy, UK Part I: Laundering the Proceeds 
of Crime—Methodology?, in International Guide to Money Laundering Law and 
Practice 1, 2 (Mark Simpson et al. eds., 3d ed. 2010). 
42 See Mann, supra note 41, at 102–05. 
43 To be sure, stored-value cards were vulnerable to such uses when they were 
originally introduced, largely because of regulatory gaps in applicable “know-your-
customer” rules. By all accounts, the vigorous regulatory responses to that possibility 
have substantially resolved that problem. See generally Bank Secrecy Act Regulation; 
Definitions and Other Regulations Relating to Money Services Businesses, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 43,585 (July 21, 2011) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 1010, 1021–22). 
44 See Elizabeth Klee, Paper or Plastic? The Effect of Time on Check and Debit Card Use at 
Grocery Stores 25, 27 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series No. 2006-02, 2006), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2006/200602/200602pap.pdf. Klee’s study 
examines an era in which signatures were still ubiquitous at checkouts, and one in 
which much retail processing occurred using modems over conventional phone lines. 
Thus, while the speed of check processing at the point of sale has improved slightly, if 
at all, the time to complete a card-based payment transaction has shortened 
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retail process by sharply lowering labor costs for the merchant, but also 
by decreasing the net cost to the consumer of the purchase transaction; 
existing studies (of which retailers are well aware) document the im-
portance to consumers of speedy checkout transactions.45 
The sector in which cost savings for stored-value cards as compared 
to checks are most conspicuous is in the payment of salaries. For decades, 
employers have struggled to avoid the high costs of issuing paper salary 
checks to their employees. On a per-employee basis, the cost of issuing 
the check is in the range of one dollar for each check, and apparently is still 
increasing.46 By contrast, the cost to an employer of loading funds on to a 
stored-value card is already less than a dime,47 and for the reasons dis-
cussed above, seems likely to decline steadily in the years to come; this 
suggests a savings of more than 90% of the transaction costs of payment 
from a simple switch to paying employees by stored-value card instead of 
check. 
The total cost savings from such programs are staggering, especially 
for large payers, like the federal government, which has estimated savings 
from switching some of its outstanding paper payments to stored-value 
cards at $60 million per year.48 Even a relatively small employer has much 
to gain by switching to stored-value cards from checks. For example, a 
2009 industry report estimated the annual savings for an employer with 
only 1,000 employees (and thus presumably many fewer check-receiving 
employees)49 at $11,880.50 
 
markedly, so that card-based payments plainly have become the speediest method of 
retail payment. 
45 Id. at 27. 
46 Keitel, supra note 19, at 21 (stating that in 2010 check issuance costs were 
estimated at $1.03 per check). The costs of processing lost payroll checks are even 
more staggering, in the range of $8 to $10 per item. Motivano, White Paper: Payroll 
Cards Facts & Statistics 5 (2009), http://www.motivano.com/datasheets/ 
SmartCashFactsAndStats.pdf (stating data from the American payroll association). 
The rate of error for stored-value cards is likely to be much lower, and there is no 
reason to think that the costs of reloading cards will be any higher than the costs of 
the original loading. 
47 Keitel, supra note 19, at 21. 
48 Id. (stating that the Treasury Department estimates savings from switching 
some of its outstanding paper payments to stored-value cards at $300 million in five 
years). Similar data exists in other countries. For instance, the Canadian Task Force 
for the Payments System Review estimated that the social cost saving from Canada 
“going digital” will be $7.7 billion for a year. See Task Force for the Payments Sys. 
Review, Going Digital: Transitioning to Digital Payments 17, available at 
http://paymentsystemreview.ca/wp-content/themes/psr-esp-hub/documents/r03_eng.pdf. 
49 Because the cheapest method of payment typically is for employers to pay their 
employees by an Automated Clearing House (ACH) transfer to the employees’ bank 
accounts, the switch from checks to stored-value cards generally applies only to the 
subgroup of employees who will not accept ACH transfers—generally speaking those 
without a demand-deposit account. The surprising number of those employees 
reflects the continuing difficulty in penetrating LMI households with mainstream 
financial services, a dominant theme of the following Section of this Essay. See Jesse 
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The most staggering costs of checks traditionally have come from the 
costs of processing them once they are written. Because traditional check 
processing involves the transportation of the paper item from the bank of 
first deposit to the bank on which the check is drawn,51 the process for 
years consumed a disproportionate share of social resources, much of it 
coming from the operations of the Federal Reserve banks (at least indi-
rectly subsidized by federal tax dollars). Thus, as recently as a decade 
ago, the cost of processing checks, perhaps three dollars per check, 
amounted to about 0.5% of the entire gross domestic product of the 
country.52 To be fair, those processing costs surely have fallen markedly 
with the rise of Check 21,53 which has substantially limited the amount of 
paper-based processing.54 
Those processing improvements, albeit important to the system, do 
nothing to remove the costs of issuing, delivering, and receiving the pa-
per instrument, discussed above. It is the promise of saving those costs, 
ineradicably inherent in the initial use of a paper check, that so ad-
vantages stored-value cards as a consumer payment system. 
B. Fostering Inclusion in the Financial Mainstream 
Because the cost savings from the shift to stored-value cards for the 
most part accrue to the private businesses and individuals that use and 
accept those instruments, there is every reason to think that (absent legal 
and institutional obstacles) market forces would drive rapid adoption of 
the product without any affirmative governmental intervention. The 
point of this Section is to underscore a second benefit of the rise of 
stored-value cards: their potential to remedy our nation’s persistent ina-
bility to extend the financial mainstream below the middle class. Because 
the broadening of the financial mainstream has social and societal bene-
fits that accrue to the entire polity, the potential for stored-value cards to 
 
Bricker et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2007 to 2010: Evidence from the Survey 
of Consumer Finances, Fed. Res. Bull., June 2012, at 1, 32, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs/Bulletin/2012/PDF/scf12.pdf (stating that 
9.6% of United States households did not have a checking account in 2010). 
50 See Motivano, supra note 46, at 6. 
51 Mann, supra note 16, at 95–96. 
52 Mann, supra note 41, at 11. 
53 Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act (Check 21), 12 U.S.C. §§ 5001–5018 
(2012); see also Mann, supra note 16, at 141–43. 
54 Fed. Reserve Sys., The 2010 Federal Reserve Payments Study: Noncash 
Payment Trends in the United States: 2006–2009, at 8 (Apr. 5, 2011), available at 
http://www.frbservices.org/files/communications/pdf/press/2010_payments_study.pdf 
(indicating that 97% of interbank checks were cleared electronically in 2009). Since 
2003 the Federal Reserve Board has systematically closed check processing centers. 
See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve Banks 
Complete Check Processing Infrastructure Changes (Mar. 2, 2010), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20100302a.htm. 
LCB_18_4_Art_4_Mann_Haim_Final (Do Not Delete) 3/30/2015  8:21 PM 
1002 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:4 
bring those benefits would justify proactive steps to foster their use even 
apart from the cost savings discussed in the preceding Section. 
Our discussion proceeds in three steps. First, we offer a brief sum-
mary of the nature and reasons for the limited penetration of main-
stream financial products in low- and moderate-income households. Sec-
ond, we discuss the social consequences of that problem—the 
commonplace transactions and interactions from which those house-
holds consequently are excluded. Finally, building on the discussion 
above, we explain why stored-value cards are so much more likely to 
erode this problem than existing mainstream payment systems. 
1. Understanding the Underbanked 
One of the most remarkable attributes of the American financial sys-
tem in the twenty-first century is its persistent inability to deploy main-
stream products to LMI households. Despite such forceful interventions 
as the Community Reinvestment Act55 and intense attention by federal 
regulators to the placement of bank branches in under-served neighbor-
hoods, the fact remains that the financial products used by middle- and 
upper-class Americans—demand-deposit accounts, credit cards, and deb-
it cards—remain out of the reach of a large share of LMI households. 
For example, data from the Federal Deposit Insurance Cooperation 
(FDIC) suggest that 1 in every 12 households still has no bank account.56 
For the most part, those households use a set of financial products—
money orders, check-cashing services, and the like—completely separate 
from the products used by less impecunious households. For example, 
the FDIC reports that 38% of those without bank accounts used check 
cashers in 2011, and 25% used them within the last 30 days before the 
survey.57 Use of money orders is similarly concentrated among LMI 
households.58 Suffice it to say that the overwhelming majority of the 
readers of this Essay use those products rarely, if ever.59 
 
55 Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901–2908 (2012), see 
John Taylor, CRA Modernization: A Critical Moment for Underserved Neighborhoods, 
Shelterforce, Fall/Winter 2009, available at http://shelterforce.org/article/cra_ 
modernization_a_critical_moment_for_underserved_neighborhoods; John Taylor & 
Josh Silver, The Community Reinvestment Act at 30: Looking Back and Looking to the Future, 
53 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 203 (2008/09). 
56 Susan Burhouse & Yazmin Osaki, 2011 FDIC National Survey of 
Unbanked and Underbanked Households 4 (Sept. 2012), available at 
https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2012_unbankedreport.pdf. 
57 Id. at 32. 
58 Id. (stating that 49.1% of unbanked consumers used money orders in 2011, 
and that 32.1% have done so in the last 30 days). 
59 Both of us regularly teach a course in payment systems; we have not during this 
century had a student who would admit to using a money order or check casher. 
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Penetration of credit cards into LMI households is much more sub-
stantial.60 It seems plain from the limited transactional use of debit cards 
by LMI households, however, that this reflects the credit needs of these 
households more than it does the extension of a conventional middle-
class product. As one of us has explained elsewhere, the use of credit 
cards by underbanked households is quite different from the use of cred-
it cards by more affluent households. The cards are much more likely to 
involve long-term revolving credit that is much less likely ever to be re-
paid than the cards used by more affluent households. The last ones are 
likely to depend more on substantial annual fees and high charges for 
revolving account balances that periodically are paid off.61 
The complex reasons for the limited penetration of mainstream fi-
nancial products are largely beyond the scope of this Essay. Still, they 
warrant a brief discussion if only because their intractability underscores 
the social value of a product that can bypass them. The most obvious 
problem, apparent from Caskey’s path-breaking work on the subject, is 
that the business models of mainstream financial products drive cost 
structures that make the products unattractive to LMI households: a 
dominant reason that the poor do not have bank accounts is that the 
costs of having bank accounts exceed the benefits to those households of 
maintaining them.62 The costs of alternative financial services—check 
cashers, pawnshops, car-title lenders, payday lenders, and the like—seem 
outlandish to the middle-class and elites, but only because mainstream 
financial products have cost structures designed to make those products 
attractive to them, not to the poor.63 
Again, data from the FDIC underscore the continuing relevance of 
these basic product-design issues. For example, the most popular justifi-
cation for not having a checking account is the perception of the un-
derbanked that they do not have enough money.64 The same data indi-
cate a preference for alternative, paper-based payment services based on 
 
60 Ronald J. Mann, Patterns of Credit Card Use Among Low- and Moderate-Income 
Households, in Insufficient Funds 257 (Rebecca M. Blank & Michael S. Barr eds., 
2009). 
61 Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt, 2007 
U. Ill. L. Rev. 375, 385–86; Mann, supra note 60, at 262. On the prohibitions of fee-
harvesting with regard to credit-card use, see the Credit Card Accountability 
Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (CARD Act), § 105, 15 U.S.C. § 1637(d) 
(2012). 
62 John P. Caskey, Fringe Banking: Check-Cashing Outlets, Pawnshops, and 
the Poor 84–106 (1994); Ronald J. Mann, After the Great Recession: Regulating Financial 
Services for Low- and Middle-Income Communities, 69 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 729, 740–43 
(2012). 
63 See Mann, supra note 62, at 741–42. 
64 Burhouse & Osaki, supra note 56, at 27. This was the most popular answer 
among unbanked consumers (given by 32% to 33% of unbanked consumers) for not 
having a bank account. 
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convenience, speed, and fees.65 Given the general importance of conven-
ience and efficiency to consumer selection of payment services,66 the rela-
tive failure of insured depositary institutions to respond on those attrib-
utes—as compared to the marketing and service efforts of alternative 
financial-services providers—certainly must be regarded as a major cause 
of the disjunction. 
It is plain, however, that costs and related product attributes are not 
the only source of the problem. Much of the abyss between the financial 
practices of LMI households and the mainstream rests on social and psy-
chological factors—an aversion to banks rooted in something ranging 
from the discomfort of social distance to an affirmative distaste founded 
on explicit bad experiences. Thus, for example, a major justification for 
not having a bank account—offered by 26% of respondents without a 
bank account—is simply that they do not need or want one.67 Another 
group (7.1%) offered the stronger perspective that they did not like deal-
ing with banks or did not trust them.68 Similar responses to the “cold” 
and “impersonal” nature of banks commonly justify preferences for al-
ternative financial services.69 
2. The Plight of the Underbanked 
The exclusion of the underbanked from the financial mainstream 
has important consequences for all sectors of society. This is not simply a 
function of the greater cost of the products that they use, though that 
certainly contributes to the increasingly high levels of income inequality 
in the United States.70 
 
65 Id. at 38. For instance 51.8% of underbanked and 28.7% of unbanked stated 
that they used non-bank check cashing services because those were located in a more 
convenient place for them. 18.4% of underbanked and 11.3% of unbanked stated 
that they used the same service since it was a faster way to get money. And 3.4% of 
underbanked and 6.6% of unbanked mentioned that banks charge more to cash 
checks. See also Caskey, supra note 62, at 75–76. 
66 Sarah Gordon, Jennifer Romich & Eric Waithaka, A Tool for Getting by 
or Getting Ahead?: Consumers’ Views on Prepaid Cards 5–6 (2009), available at 
http://www.cfsinnovation.com/sites/default/files/imported/managed_documents/
voc-prepaidfinal.pdf. See also Elizabeth K. Kiser, Household Switching Behavior at 
Depository Institutions: Evidence from Survey Data 1 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Fin. & Econ. 
Discussion Series No. 2002-44, 2002), http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
pubs/feds/2002/200244/200244pap.pdf (listing household relocation, customer 
service, and price factors as most common reasons for changing banks). 
67 Burhouse & Osaki, supra note 56, at 27. 
68 Id. (stating that 7.1% of consumers who never had a bank account mentioned 
that the reason was their distrust in banks and/or they disliked dealing with banks). 
69 Caskey, supra note 62, at 74, 76 (stating that consumers feel more comfortable 
with non-bank check cashing outlets than with banks, and that 24% of those outlets’ 
consumers stated that “[b]anks are too cold and impersonal with people like me” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
70 Michael O’Higgins et al., Income Distribution and Redistribution: A Microdata 
Analysis for Seven Countries, in Poverty, Inequality and Income Distribution in 
Comparative Perspective 20, 33 (Timothy M. Smeeding et al. eds., 1990) (ranking 
the United States as one of the three countries with the highest degree of income 
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The problem is that the products used by the underbanked not only 
cost more than the products mainstream households use, they have a 
much more limited functionality. There are many transactions in our so-
ciety that are simply unavailable to those without a mainstream branded 
payment card. It is all but impossible to rent a car. It is difficult, though 
certainly not impossible, to reserve a hotel room.71 
More seriously, although it is not impossible, it is expensive and im-
practical to purchase from the internet-based merchants that middle- and 
upper-class households prefer without a branded payment card or a 
checking account.72 Exclusion from those merchants becomes ever more 
significant as their share of retail transactions grows so markedly from 
year to year.73 Lest those types of transactions seem like luxuries that LMI 
households better might forgo, we should remember the primary reasons 
middle- and upper-class households use those retailers: a considered 
judgment that the service they provide is so markedly superior to availa-
ble retail options.74 There is no more reason LMI households should 
have to pay more for these products than they should have to pay more 
for financial services. It is also certainly distressing as a policy matter that 
the rise of internet commerce should spread the problems caused by fi-
nancial-market segmentation into new sectors of retail commerce.75 
Taking the concern to its logical conclusion, we all benefit from a 
community of social cohesion, and we all suffer from a financially seg-
mented community in which the products, goods, and services that de-
fine success and “making it” in our culture are beyond the reach of an 
 
inequality); Liran Haim, Rethinking Consumer Protection Policy in Financial Markets, 32 
J.L. & Com. 23, 46–48 (2013); see also Koen Caminada, Kess Goudswaard & Chen 
Wang, Disentangling Income Inequality and the Redistributive Effect of Taxes and Transfers in 
20 LIS Countries over Time, at 12 (Lux. Income Study, Working Paper No. 581, 2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2168885 (stating 
that those results remain constant over time). 
71 Ivan Daniel, 5 Things You Can’t Quite Do Without a Credit Card, GET.COM (Aug. 
21, 2014), https://get.com/blog/5-things-you-cant-do-without-a-credit-card. See also 
Mary Pilon, Life Without Credit Cards, Wall St. J. Blog (June 18, 2009), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/wallet/2009/06/18/life-without-credit-cards. 
72 See Ronald J. Mann, Electronic Commerce 707 (4th ed. 2011) (stating the 
main payment instruments used for distance selling are credit cards, debit cards, and 
ACH). 
73 U.S. E-Commerce Sales, 2013–2017, Internet Retailer, http://www. 
internetretailer.com/trends/sales/us-e-commerce-sales-2013-2017 (stating that online 
retail sales in the United States will grow in a compound annual rate of 9.5% from 
2013 to 2018, and that by 2018 the web will account for 11% of United States retail 
sales). 
74 See Chris Anderson, The Long Tail: Why the Future of Business Is 
Selling Less of More 168–91 (2008). 
75 David Caplovitz, The Poor Pay More: Consumer Practices of Low-
Income Families 12–31 (1967) (discussing adaptation to low-income consumers by 
durable-goods merchants). The real answer is that the Internet could mitigate the 
geographic segmentation that is such a large part of the reason that the poor pay 
more, but only if the poor could get the financial instruments to get to the internet. 
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identifiable and substantial part of the populace. A financial product that 
can make inroads on that problem provides value to us all. 
3. Using Cards to Mainstream the Underbanked 
The natural question, then, is why stored-value cards provide the 
“magic bullet” that can solve a problem that has festered, intractably, for 
much of the post-war era. The basic answer lies in the cost advantages 
discussed above: the steadily decreasing costs of electronic processing of 
information have lowered the costs of deploying payment cards that 
monitor balances in real time on a transaction-by-transaction basis. 
Therefore, it is now practical, at a fraction the costs of processing tradi-
tional paper-based payments, to deploy those products with little or no 
consideration of the individual creditworthiness of the end users. To put 
the point another way, the central cost advantage of stored-value cards is 
that they involve no extension of credit and thus avoid any costs to an is-
suer for collecting information about the creditworthiness or financial 
responsibility of the cardholder.76 
To be sure, the information-processing problem is one that would 
have been daunting only a decade ago. For example, the large payroll-
card issuer must allocate every two weeks to each account the correct 
amount of salary disbursed to that employee. Then, when the employee 
uses the card, the issuer must identify the correct card account, check the 
balance, and account for the transaction, all in the fraction of a second 
typical for modern branded-card processing in this country. This is not at 
all unusual for the major card networks and acquirers in this country, but 
it is something that could not successfully have been done without the 
advances in information processing of the last few decades. 
With those advances, however, we have the promise of a product that 
is ideally suited for deployment among the underbanked. Because the 
product often (especially in the payroll context) carries one of the major 
payment-card brands (Visa or MasterCard), the product is likely to be ac-
cepted at substantially all mainstream merchant outlets at which the users 
are likely to spend money. Because the product on its face is indistin-
guishable from the credit and debit cards middle- and upper-income 
households have preferred for decades, the product avoids the social 
stigma (and inconvenience) associated with food stamps and similar pre-
vious techniques for deploying financial assistance to LMI households. 
 
76 To be sure, as discussed above, the issuer does need to comply with know-your-
customer rules designed to limit money laundering, but that is a simple question of 
verifying identity, which even for most LMI households is a much simpler (and 
cheaper) problem than collecting credit information: many poor households will 
often have very limited credit information, which makes it quite difficult to assess 
them under conventional “credit scoring” systems. However, they are still likely to 
have a driver’s license or other identity documentation indisputably adequate to 
support receipt of a stored-value card. That is particularly true in the employment 
context, where immigration rules will almost compel employers, at least those who 
pay a periodic salary, to have such documentation. 
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The fact is, the product works precisely the same as the mainstream debit 
card and has for all practical purposes the same cost structure to LMI 
households as the debit card has for mainstream households.77 
The most obvious reason to doubt the viability of the stored-value 
card based on that conceptual discussion is the “network” problem of 
payment networks: given the need for multi-party payment products to 
be simultaneously deployed by issuers and accepted by merchants, it tra-
ditionally has been quite difficult for new products to break into the 
market.78 
The stored-value card has avoided that problem for two distinct rea-
sons. First, because the major products bear the Visa and MasterCard 
marks, and have been deployed through their networks, they feed into 
the existing dominant market structure of merchant outlets. The honor-
all-cards rules of Visa and MasterCard effectively require merchants to 
take the new product simply because it bears the Visa and MasterCard 
marks.79 Second, the widespread deployment of payroll cards by large 
employers and, most importantly, the federal government over the last 
decade has jumpstarted a market so abruptly that there is no longer a ba-
sis for doubting whether the product will succeed, only uncertainty as to 
how large it will grow. For instance, over 1.5 million LMI consumers al-
ready receive their monthly social-security payments by electronic trans-
fers (assuming they have a bank account) or by stored-value cards.80 An-
other 45 million consumers eligible for tax refunds can also now choose 
to get their payments in the same way.81 
Perhaps the biggest problem with consumer adoption of stored-value 
cards is the perception that they have “negative float”—the value must be 
placed on the card at one point in time, and reside there until it can be 
used. This differs, at least in perception, from payment devices like cash 
and checks, where the consumer retains the funds until the consumer 
wishes to spend them. In truth, however, there is little practical differ-
ence as long as the consumer regards the funds on the card as still “in 
hand.” In practical effect, in a world in which demand-deposit accounts 
bear negative implicit interest rates, the “cost” of “putting (or holding) 
funds on a card” is unlikely to be any more than “holding” them in a 
bank account. So the difference between leaving funds in a bank ac-
count—sent there by an ACH transfer—and leaving funds on a general-
 
77 There is the potential for adversely differential fee structures. We discuss 
proper responses to that problem in the policy discussion below. See infra Part III.(D). 
78 David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Paying with Plastic: The Digital 
Revolution in Buying and Borrowing 159–212 (2d ed. 2005). 
79 Mann, supra note 15, at 655. 
80 Keitel, supra note 19, at 21. See also Management of Federal Agency 
Disbursements, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,315 (Dec. 22, 2010) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 208). 
81 Keitel, supra note 19, at 21, see Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 
Treasury Launches Pilot Program of Prepaid Debit and Payroll Cards for Fast, Safe 
and Convenient Tax Refunds (Jan. 13, 2011), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/tg1021.aspx. 
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purpose stored-value payroll card—sent there by an electronic fund 
transfer from the employer—seems so academic that it is unlikely to af-
fect consumer use or perceptions. 
C. Routines of Credit and Debit 
The third and final benefit of stored-value cards draws directly on 
the credit-free nature of the product discussed in the preceding Section. 
Because routine use of stored-value cards, especially for households that 
have not previously used a mainstream payment card, will not involve the 
use of credit, deployment of those cards will limit the routine use of cred-
it cards as the payment card of choice. 
One of us has written extensively on the adverse social costs of the 
unusually high levels of routine credit-card use in this country.82 Essen-
tially, the argument is that credit cards are associated with financial dis-
tress83: analysis of time-series data at the national level suggests a substan-
tial and statistically significant relation between the level of credit-card 
use in a country, on the one hand, and the rate of bankruptcy filings, on 
the other.84 The reasons for that effect are difficult to discern. They 
doubtlessly relate in part to the ease of payment, which associates credit-
card use with an increased rate of unreflective spending.85 The effect also 
certainly relates to the ease of borrowing, attributable at least in part to 
the complex and confusing design of the product.86 
Whatever the underlying reason might be, that work argues that the 
countries that have avoided this problem successfully (such as Japan) 
have done so for the most part by developing card-based payment systems 
in which the extension of credit is not common.87 It goes on to argue that 
the most salient public-policy response in this country would be to foster 
the routine use of payment cards that do not involve extensions of cred-
it.88 
Against the backdrop of that work, the possibility that LMI house-
holds might enter the financial mainstream with stored-value cards seems 
like a godsend, too good to be true.89 The set of households most at risk 
of financial distress, which traditionally have been the least well served by 
mainstream financial providers, could move directly into the financial 
 
82 Mann, supra note 41, at 51–72; Mann, supra note 61, at 384–87. 
83 Mann, supra note 41, at 49–51. 
84 Id. at 60–72. 
85 Id. at 46–47; see Mann, supra note 61, at 403. 
86 See Mann, supra note 15, at 655–58 (stating that consumers will find it difficult 
to tell the difference between their debit card and their credit card due to product 
design). 
87 See Mann, supra note 30. 
88 See Mann, supra note 61, at 403; Mann, supra note 60, at 263 (stating that LMI 
households mainly use credit cards to receive revolving credit). 
89 See Mann, supra note 60, at 280 (summarizing high credit-card debt among 
LMI households). 
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mainstream with a product that avoids the risks of prolonged borrow-
ing—risks that have afflicted so many of the relatively invulnerable 
households using the mainstream products in recent decades. On the 
scale of social benefits, this must count as a major benefit in favor of the 
deployment of the stored-value card. 
III. SOCIAL RISK ASSOCIATED WITH STORED-VALUE CARDS 
The analysis to this point unequivocally supports the development of 
public and private institutions to foster consumer use of stored-value 
cards. It does, however, ignore several obvious ways in which those cards 
expose consumers to risks greater than those associated with the more 
conventional credit and debit cards commonly used by middle- and up-
per-class consumers. This Part of the Essay considers the four most im-
portant risks—issuer insolvency, fraudulent transactions, escheat of un-
used funds and fees—and summarizes policies that can readily mitigate 
those risks. 
At the outset, we emphasize our awareness of the risk that regulation 
specifying the content of the product can hinder market development by 
legislating a particular mix of product attributes that might not be opti-
mal for all consumers. We discuss in the sections below regulatory op-
tions that respond to that problem, designed to blunt the likelihood that 
the policies we recommend might prevent consumers from obtaining the 
products that they actively seek. 
A. Issuer Insolvency 
The most salient risk unique to stored-value cards arises directly from 
the defining feature of the cards: the cardholder dedicates funds to the 
card in advance of the purchase transaction. By providing those funds in 
advance, the cardholder directly exposes himself or herself to the risk 
that the issuer will lose those funds so that they will be unavailable when 
the cardholder attempts to redeem them through use of the card. That 
could happen either through a failure to maintain the funds separately 
or through a general insolvency that would leave the issuer without funds 
sufficient to match the balances remaining on previously issued cards. 
To be sure, debit cards expose the cardholder to a similar risk: that 
the issuer of the debit card may become insolvent, thus losing the funds 
previously deposited by the cardholder in the account that backs the 
card. In that case, however, because the issuer of the debit card is (for all 
practical purposes) always a depositary institution, the risk of loss to the 
cardholder is minimized by federal deposit insurance. In the case of a 
stored-value card, the availability of federal insurance is much less cer-
tain. In the first place, there is nothing inherent in the stored-value card 
that requires it to be issued by a financial institution. Indeed, in the case 
of closed-loop cards, it is fair to assume that the great majority of cards 
are not issued by financial institutions. Moreover, even when the issuer of 
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the card is a financial institution, the availability of federal deposit insur-
ance requires complex actions on the part of the issuer,90 actions that are 
not required by any body of existing law. Thus, as the law stands now, 
there is no affirmative requirement that the issuer take any steps to en-
sure the availability of the funds deposited onto the card by the card-
holder.91 
Given the likelihood that consumers are not fully aware of these 
risks, the obvious response is to require the issuers of the cards to take 
the steps necessary to protect the cardholders. In the case of financial in-
stitutions, that is simple enough because of their ready ability to segre-
gate the funds in accounts protected for the cardholders by deposit in-
surance.92 To be sure, there is no reason that stored-value cards must be 
issued by financial institutions, and it would be unfortunate if regulation 
unnecessarily tilted the field to prevent nonfinancial institutions from 
competing against banks. That is particularly important with respect to 
products that are of particular importance for LMI households, given the 
relative inability of banks to effectively reach those households.93 
A simple two-step response should be adequate to resolve that prob-
lem. Most obviously, at the first step, institutions that wish to issue stored-
value cards can be obligated to place the funds received from their card-
holders in accounts that qualify for customer-level deposit-insurance pro-
tection under the existing FDIC program. To be sure, that does not deal 
with the possibility that the non-depositary issuing institutions might fail 
to maintain the appropriate balances in those accounts. On that point, 
however, the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that grant the CFPB regu-
latory authority over nonfinancial institutions that provide important 
consumer financial services94 should allow the CFPB to monitor compli-
 
90 Insurability of Funds Underlying Stored Value Cards and Other 
Nontraditional Access Mechanisms (General Counsel’s Opinion No. 8), 73 Fed. Reg. 
67,155 (Nov. 13, 2008). Generally speaking, that opinion establishes three steps an 
issuer must take for FDIC deposit insurance to extend to an account that holds funds 
deposited on stored-value cards: (1) the funds must be placed in an account under 
the cardholder’s name or in an account that discloses the existence of the agency or 
custodial relationship; (2) the records of the insured depository institution or the 
issuer must disclose the identities of and amounts deposited by the cardholders; and 
(3) the cardholders (rather than the issuer) must be the owners of the card-
associated account. Id. at 67,156. 
91 For a conspicuous counterexample, see 31 C.F.R. § 210.5(b)(5)(i)(B) (2013) 
(requiring pass-through deposit insurance for a card to be eligible to receive federal 
payments). 
92 According to General Counsel’s Opinion No. 8, the easiest way for financial 
institutions to set up such an account would be to create it in the cardholder’s name. 
General Counsel’s Opinion No. 8, supra note 90. 
93 See Ronald J. Mann, A Requiem for Sam’s Bank, 83 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 953, 967–72 
(2008); Mann, supra note 62, at 743–44. 
94 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, §§ 1001–1100H, 124 Stat. 1376, 1955–2113 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.). The regulatory authority directed 
LCB_18_4_Art_4_Mann_Haim_Final (Do Not Delete) 3/30/2015  8:21 PM 
2014] PUTTING STORED-VALUE CARDS IN THEIR PLACE 1011 
ance with that obligation and any other related issues of financial stability 
that might undermine the reliability of that protection.95 
At the second step, regulators might wish to consider the possibility 
of permitting the issuance of a card for which the stored values are not 
deposit protected. At first glance, the casual reader might wonder why 
any consumer would affirmatively select a card that did not include pro-
tection of funds on the card. The answer depends on context. In the con-
text of particularly localized closed-loop programs, like those operated 
on university or corporate campuses, it might well be that the costs of es-
tablishing the accounts discussed above would dwarf the benefits of the 
program.96 That suggests the propriety of a regulatory exception for 
those cards, which might be premised on (1) a limitation on the maxi-
mum amount to be stored on the card at any one time (presumably 
something less than $250) together with a limitation on the program vol-
ume (to keep the exception limited for small, localized programs only); 
and (2) an emphatic branding requirement related to the lack of insur-
ance. What we have in mind on the latter point is something like the 
phrase UNPROTECTED CARD in two lines of bold-face all-capital type 
about one inch high on the face of the card. 
B. Unauthorized Use 
The second risk uniquely associated with stored-value cards is the 
risk that the funds will be lost through unauthorized use. For credit cards 
and debit cards, federal law for decades has provided regulatory protec-
tion (under the TILA/Z and EFTA/E regimes, respectively) against un-
authorized use.97 However, as discussed above, neither of those regimes 
 
specifically at nonbank financial-service providers appears in section 1024 of Dodd-
Frank, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5514 (2012). 
95 One such issue might include clarification that closed-loop issuers that deposit 
their cardholder funds in accordance with General Counsel’s Opinion No. 8 would 
entitle their customers to pass-through deposit insurance in case of issuer insolvency. 
General Counsel’s Opinion, supra note 90.  
96 That is particularly true where the cards are “unhosted,” so that the only 
record of value resides on the card (the common mechanism for magnetic-stripe 
subway cards until recently). For those cards, given the absence of a record in the 
issuer’s possession of the funds on the card at any given time, the insurance program 
would not be practical. To put it another way, such an exception would be necessary 
if the regulatory system is to tolerate the continued issuance of unhosted cards. See 
Mann, supra note 16, at 337–39 (discussing the mechanism of unhosted stored-value 
cards). 
97 TILA/Z refers to Regulation Z of the Truth in Lending Act, 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026 
(2013); EFTA/E refers to Regulation E the Electronic Fund Transfers Act, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 30,923 (proposed May 24, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1005). That is 
not to say those protections are perfect. For suggestions of ways those regimes could 
be rationalized, see Mann, supra note 15, at 652–73. 
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applies for stored-value cards.98 Accordingly, except for protections vol-
untarily provided by issuers, cardholders are exposed to the risk that if 
their cards are lost or stolen, third parties will dissipate the funds on the 
cards. A strong case could be made that cardholders bearing some of the 
risk of loss is appropriate to ensure that they are not negligent in protect-
ing their cards.99 Nevertheless, for all other card-based payment systems, 
our society has adopted a regime that reflects the sensible intuition that 
technological innovations by the issuers are the best way to limit such 
losses.100 Even if that conclusion is debatable, it seems particularly per-
verse to single out for limited protection the card that is most likely to be 
used by LMI households, while requiring those protections for the credit 
and debit cards commonly used by middle- and upper-class households. 
To be sure, Visa and MasterCard101 already provide protection 
against unauthorized transactions for their cards that in many cases102 is 
superior to that required by the TILA/Z and EFTA/E regimes. Although 
that suggests a market pressure towards a protective solution on this par-
ticular attribute, it does not in any way undermine the need for regulato-
ry intervention. Most other issuers, in particular (so far as we know) most 
of the closed-loop issuers, provide no such protection; a loss of those 
cards is, for all intents and purposes, a loss of the funds.103 
A regulatory intervention would underscore the difference between 
the cards that provide those protections and those that do not.104 The 
natural ensuing question is whether there is a basis here for a regulatory 
exception, parallel to the one discussed above for uninsured cards. We 
are inclined to think such an exception should exist for the small-volume 
programs discussed above, but it should be strictly limited to marked, 
 
98 Some specific types of open-loop stored-value cards have been included over 
the recent years under Regulation E protection. 12 C.F.R. §§ 205.2(b)(2) (discussing 
payroll cards), 205.15 (discussing EBT cards). 
99 Mann, supra note 15, at 638. 
100 Id. 
101 American Express and Discover do have similar regimes, but given their 
relatively limited importance in the stored-value card market we refer here for 
convenience only to the Visa and MasterCard programs. 
102 The Visa and MasterCard regimes are much more absolute in their 
protections, setting “zero-dollar” limits, where the TILA/Z and EFTA/E regimes have 
small-dollar “coinsurance” provisions. For the zero liability rule see: 
http://usa.visa.com/personal/security/zero-liability.jsp http://www.mastercard.us/ 
zero-liability.html. For a discussion on the TILA/Z and EFTA/E rules see Mann, 
supra note 16, at 151–53, 209–10. 
103 For instance, the Starbucks stored-value card provides unauthorized use 
protection subject to online registration of the card. That protection, though, applies 
only to funds that were associated with the card at the time Starbucks was notified of 
its loss. See Starbucks Card Terms & Conditions, Starbucks (2014), 
http://www.starbucks.com/card/card-terms-and-conditions. 
104 The CFPB’s pending notice of proposed regulation suggests a likelihood that 
the CFPB is considering a regulation along these lines. See Regulation E, 77 Fed. Reg. 
30,923 (proposed May 24, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1005). 
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unhosted cards (where it is not practical to provide the protection), and 
the maximum dollar amount that can be loaded on the unprotected 
cards should be strictly limited to something in the vicinity of $250. 
C. Loss of Unused Funds 
The last salient risk uniquely associated with stored-value cards is the 
risk that the funds, if unspent, will be appropriated either to the issuer or 
the State through dormancy fees and escheat rules. This problem is 
uniquely associated with stored-value cards because they are the only 
cards where funds are associated directly with the card. Moreover, be-
cause the cards can be issued with only a limited relation between the is-
suer and the cardholder—a benefit in extending the market reach of the 
cards—it is particularly likely that the issuer will lose touch with the card-
holder. Accordingly, and especially in the early days of stored-value cards, 
it has been common for value initially loaded on the cards to be appro-
priated by the issuer (through dormancy fees) or transferred to the State 
through escheat rules.105 
Some simple regulatory approaches here are apparent. First, the 
dormancy fees are a classic example of the kind of “shrouded” back-end 
fees that are a classic problem in card markets.106 It would seem appropri-
ate, then, to ban those fees in the first instance. The CARD Act107 already 
has banned those fees, but only for gift cards.108 That ban should be ex-
tended to cover all stored-value cards.109 Although reasonable minds 
might differ, we see no reason to except the small, unhosted programs 
discussed above from that requirement; because the premise of the inter-
vention is that consumers are unlikely to rationally price a probability this 
remote, it seems simpler to ban the dormancy fees and let issuers use up-
front pricing (which is apparent to their customers) to make any neces-
sary adjustments to their fee structures. 
The second response is to mandate a practical mechanism for con-
sumers to access the last remaining value on the card. One of the most 
likely reasons for residual unspent value will be the difficulty of spending 
precisely the amount loaded onto a card. This is seen most easily with a 
 
105 See Keitel, supra note 18, at 9 (stating that in the United States approximately 
20 states require that unclaimed funds which are accessible by closed-loop stored-
value cards be reported and reverted to the state under abandoned-property laws). 
106 See Mann, supra note 41, at 136–37; Haim, supra note 70, at 32; Ronald J. 
Mann, “Contracting” for Credit, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 899, 912–13 (2006). See generally 
Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information 
Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. Econ. 505 (2006) (detailed economic 
analysis of “shrouded” product attributes). 
107 § 105, 15 U.S.C. § 1637(d) (2012). 
108 Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. § 1005.20(a)(3)(i)–(ii) (2013). 
109 The CFPB’s authority to prevent unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices by 
financial firms should be more than adequate to extend to this situation. See 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5531 (2012). The rulemaking notice discussed above suggests that the CFPB shares 
this view of its authority. 
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closed-loop gift card. Assume, for example, that the consumer receives a 
$100 gift card from a merchant that the consumer does not frequent. If 
the consumer visits the merchant’s store and tries to spend as much of 
the card as possible without going out of pocket—after all, who wants to 
pay to get a birthday present—it is almost inevitable that some small 
amount will remain unspent. Because this problem seems particularly 
acute for closed-loop cards, we recommend a regulatory requirement 
that consumers be permitted to cash out (without additional charges) a 
de minimis unspent amount on the a closed-loop card—perhaps the 
greater of five dollars or five percent of the total amount loaded on the 
card. This option should be available to the consumer at the merchant’s 
business place or from the same platform through which the card was ini-
tially issued. 
The third prong of responses on this point relates to escheat fees, 
traditionally the province of state (rather than federal) law.110 Here, we 
are indeed not sufficiently informed to be sure there is a problem that 
warrants intervention. At some point, we think it makes sense for funds to 
escheat to the State—imagine the polar case in which there has been no 
activity on a card for twenty years and the issuer has been unable to reach 
the cardholder despite reasonable efforts. Here, there seems no ap-
proach more sensible than escheat to the State. If a case could be made 
that state-escheat laws were taking funds with undue rapidity, at a point 
when cardholders reasonably might be located or might decide to spend 
the funds, then a case for federal regulatory intervention might be made 
out to establish a “floor” that must be satisfied before funds can be es-
cheated. To date, however, we do not think that case has been made. 
Moreover, we expect that the “cashing-out” rule we recommend above 
would diminish considerably the small-dollar values left indefinitely on 
closed-loop cards. 
D. The Problem of Fees 
We turn in closing to the problem of fees, which we save for last in 
part because it has been such a prominent part of the existing discussion 
that a variety of proposals already are at hand. The case for regulation of 
fees has several prongs, all of which tend to suggest that consumers are 
not adequately pricing the fees in their calculations of whether it makes 
sense to acquire the cards. The main concern is that the fees are not ad-
equately salient to consumers when they acquire the cards; they could be 
regarded, like the dormancy fees discussed above, as another example of 
the “shrouded” contract terms that Gabaix and Laibson decry.111 Here, 
that problem is exacerbated by the likelihood that the cards are present-
ed to their users, in many circumstances, as a non-negotiable proposition; 
 
110 William S. King, Note, A Bridge Too Far: Due Process Considerations in State 
Unclaimed-Property Law Enforcement, 45 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1249, 1252–53 (2012). 
111 See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
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this is particularly true in the payroll context. What this means is that the 
consumer has no opportunity to negotiate terms; the consumer’s choice 
is to accept the card or accept some even-less-convenient method for re-
ceiving salary.112 Three regulatory approaches are apparent: letting the 
market set the fees, requiring disclosure of the fees, or imposing substan-
tive regulation of the amount of the fees. 
The first question is whether regulation is appropriate at all. To the 
extent that consumers acquire the cards in a competitive market, there 
might seem little reason for the government to step in to set the “price” 
at which the payment services are sold. But, of course, the problem with 
that position is the premise of a competitive market in which card pur-
chasers accurately “price” the fees. As suggested above, that is particularly 
unrealistic in the payroll-card context. Even in other contexts, such as gift 
cards, it seems unlikely that customers accurately price the fees when 
they price the cards. Can the consumer purchasing a gift card accurately 
assess the impact of future per-transaction or periodic fees? Perhaps, if 
the fee structures are well-disclosed and not unduly complicated. But it 
seems clear that the consumer could assess them more accurately if the 
issuer capitalized all necessary fees into a single charge included in the 
price of the card. The issuer, for example, might charge an extra five 
percent of the amount of a gift card up front, rather than a series of fees 
in the future; as the issuer is better placed than the purchaser to assess 
the likely total fees over the life of the card, the issuer could set that price 
more accurately than the consumer could predict the fees. At that point, 
there would be little concern about mispricing, because the fees would 
now be charged up-front.113 
The issue is a little more problematic with respect to reloadable 
cards. In that situation, the fees for loading funds onto the cards could 
be regarded as metering the consumer’s use of the card in transactions 
that in fact impose costs on the issuer—each act of loading the card re-
quires the equivalent of an ACH transfer, and thus is likely to impose 
some costs on the issuer.114 Even here, though, a limit of the maximum 
loading fee to some multiple of likely costs seems reasonable enough. If 
the CFPB knew, for example, that the true costs of a transaction loading 
the card (including an allotment for the salary and rent of employees in 
 
112 In some cases, as in the federal government program, the recipient without a 
bank account has no choice but to accept the card—the government no longer 
disburses benefits payments by check or cash. 
113 Issuers might be concerned that the absence of a per-transaction fee would 
expose them to undue processing costs from cardholders that use the cards for an 
unusually large number of unusually small transactions. Given the low per-transaction 
processing costs discussed above, that problem does not strike us as critical. If it did 
seem serious, regulations could permit issuers to require a minimum transaction 
amount for use of the card without a transaction fee. The ability of the federal Direct 
Express program (discussed below) to ban such fees suggests, however, that issuers in 
reality have no real need for such a fee. 
114 See Mann, supra note 72, at 742. 
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the retail location loading the card) amounted to approximately 50 cents 
per transaction (an estimate that seems quite high to us), and if we knew 
that the present industry norm for loading fees is several multiples of 
those costs (two to five dollars), does it seem plausible that the market for 
those fees is functioning well? 
In the end, then, we conclude that some form of fee regulation is 
appropriate. Turning to the form of the regulation, the most common 
proposal is for detailed disclosures. For example, the proposed Prepaid 
Card Disclosure Act of 2014 would require something like a “Schumer” 
box with a detailed disclosure of the various fee amounts.115 Recognizing 
that our views on this question are driven largely by a general skepticism 
of disclosure, and that this Essay is not the place to argue the merits (or 
demerits) of disclosure, we express a general doubt that the costs of those 
sorts of disclosures can justify the benefits they will bring.116 For the most 
part, we expect, the disclosures will do little or nothing to alter the un-
derstanding or product choices of the consumers that receive them. Ac-
cordingly, we think the costs of requiring them are largely unjustified.117 
We turn then to the question of mandatory fee regulation. In our 
view, the question of fee regulation should be largely contextual. It is, ac-
cordingly, beyond the scope of this brief Essay to consider all the possible 
contexts. It is instructive, however, to consider how our mode of analysis 
applies to three of the most common contexts. 
The first is the question of transaction and periodic fees for gift 
cards that are not reloadable. As suggested above, we think it is plain that 
the best solution here is to ban those fees entirely, requiring the issuers 
to charge those fees in the most transparent manner—including them as 
part of the up-front price of the card. 
Also following from the discussion above is our view on fees related 
to reloading reloadable cards. Here, we believe the best approach is a cap 
set at several multiples of the true expected costs of the transaction. If we 
are correct in our sense that the “all-in” transaction costs are unlikely to 
exceed 50 cents per transaction, then it well might be reasonable to cap 
loading fees at $1 (a figure much lower than the present industry norm 
but far exceeding any likely costs of the transaction, even for small issu-
ers). Again, we suspect that any such cap would allow issuers to recover 
their variable costs related to loading transactions. If that fee were inade-
quate to cover more general costs, the simple (and transparent) remedy 
for the issuer would be to increase the up-front price of the card. 
 
115 See Prepaid Card Disclosure Act of 2014, S. 1903, 113th Cong. (2014). 
116 Haim, supra note 70, at 37–38. 
117 Id. For a general criticism of disclosures, with which we largely agree, see 
Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, More Than You Wanted to Know: The 
Failure of Mandated Disclosure (2014). 
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The hardest problem relates to fees for payroll cards, which have 
generated by far the most scrutiny.118 The case for imposing costs on the 
cardholder is somewhat stronger here; the cardholder often benefits 
from the card because the costs of acquiring funds on the card are so 
much lower than the fees of other acquisition transactions (such as cash-
ing a check at a third-party check casher). Still, we are inclined again to 
conclude that these fees probably should be banned, in favor of a model 
that internalizes the processing costs with the issuer. 
For one thing, the issuer is far more likely to notice, and attempt to 
minimize, the costs of processing than the cardholder, who has little or 
no control over those costs; ordinary economic principles suggest that 
those costs will be managed most effectively if their burden is placed on 
the party in the best place to minimize them. In that model, the residual 
processing costs would be priced into the employee’s salary structure; if 
the actual processing costs are far less than the alternatives available to 
the employer (as seems likely), then forced internalization should have 
no negative effect on the employers’ salary structure. 
We should add that our conclusion on this point is motivated pri-
marily by the example of the federal government’s Direct Express pro-
gram (through which a wide variety of federal benefits are disbursed). It 
is a condition of participation in that program that issuers waive substan-
tially all fees related to the cards.119 Thus, there can be no fees for loading 
benefits onto the cards, for purchases in the United States, or for with-
drawing cash at purchases or from bank tellers or, once each pay period, 
from ATMs.120 The only permitted fees relate to such things as multiple 
ATM withdrawals in a single pay period, insisting on paper statements, 
seeking more than one replacement card per year, or purchases from 
merchants outside the United States. 
The existence, and success, of the Direct Express card shows that an 
issuer can execute a successful program without any substantial volume 
of back-end fees. In a way, this should come as no surprise. Unlike the 
credit card—where the issuer advances funds up-front and needs revenue 
after the fact to cover the cost of the funds and operating costs—the 
stored-value-card issuer receives funds up-front, and thus can rely on rev-
enues from holding those funds to defray the operating costs of the sys-
tem. With advances in the efficiency of electronic processing, it should 
 
118 See, e.g., Herb Weisbaum, Feds: Employers Can’t Force Payroll Debit Cards on 
Workers, TODAY (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.today.com/money/feds-employers-cant-
force-payroll-debit-cards-workers-8C11312099; Martha C. White, Nickeled, Dimed, and 
Dollared to Death: Fee-Laden Payroll Cards Forced on Low-Wage Workers, Time (July 9, 
2013), http://business.time.com/2013/07/09/nickeled-dimed-and-dollared-to-death-
fee-laden-payroll-cards-forced-on-low-wage-workers. 
119 Frequently Asked Questions, DirectExpress, https://www.usdirectexpress.com/ 
edcfdtclient/docs/faq.html (posting the permitted fee structure). 
120 With the slight exception that third-party ATM providers can charge 
surcharges (as they can for any withdrawals in the conventional-card market). 
LCB_18_4_Art_4_Mann_Haim_Final (Do Not Delete) 3/30/2015  8:21 PM 
1018 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:4 
come as no surprise if the processing costs and overhead can largely be 
covered by revenues accruing to the issuer based on the balances it holds. 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay is a discursive attempt to analyze the impact of a relatively 
new payments innovation. In our view, the cards have the potential to 
solve one of the most persistently embarrassing problems in the provision 
of financial services in our country—the limited penetration of main-
stream products to LMI households—and to forestall the extension into 
those households of the routinized credit use that plagues more affluent 
households in our economy. Accordingly, we believe that regulation 
should shift from a position of hostility, or even disinterest, toward a posi-
tion of affirmative support. That is particularly true for the general-
purpose reloadable cards that have the most direct potential to bring 
LMI households into the financial mainstream. 
We summarize above a series of simple and straightforward regulato-
ry approaches that should give LMI households access to financial prod-
ucts that are functionally similar to the products middle- and upper-
income households have used for decades. If those products are confined 
so that they expose LMI households to no more risks than those that 
middle- and upper-income bear on their cards, this can signal movement 
forward in resolving a longstanding problem of central importance to 
LMI households. 
We recognize that our analysis rests on assumptions and conjectures 
that might not be shared by all readers. We offer it primarily as a tem-
plate for further discussion. Whatever the ultimate results, we are con-
vinced that the burgeoning use of these cards should be welcomed and 
fostered whenever possible by regulators at all levels of government. 
